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The Sanctions Problem:____ International and European
Perspectives
Part I: The International Perspective
Recollected in tranquillity, as an abstract problem in 
international relations, the continued willingness of 
governments to employ economic sanctions in international 
disputes is undoubtedly puzzling. The conventional wisdom, 
after all, is that they do not work. Since 1945 they have 
been repeatedly imposed by individual states, by alliances, 
regional organisations and by the United Nations itself and 
in virtually no case have they been unambiguously successful. 
The standard academic explanation runs roughly as follows: 
to be effective sanctions generally require universality of 
application and a high degree of dependence in the target 
state; although they raise costs to the target state, the 
increase is seldom sufficient to purchase compliance and is 
often greater for the country imposing the sanction; and they 
frequently have perverse effects, creating out of the seige 
mentality a sense of national cohesion and determination to 
triumph in adversity that was previously lacking while 
dividing the sanctioning nation within itself and from its 
allies. Nor is this view confined to the academic community 
over a period of thirty years West European politicians 
and officials have regularly employed similar arguments in 
debating with the United States about the wisdom and the 
necessity of the strategic embargo against the Soviet Union 
and its allies. And, in a different context, the United 
States itself has joined in the chorus whenever it has been 
considered necessary (and it always has) to resist Afro-Asian 
pressure at the United Nations for the imposition of 
mandatory sanctions against South Africa.
(1 )
But if scepticism about the utility of sanctions is 
widespread, it has never acted as a general constraint 
against their use in particular circumstances. Indeed it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that in the modern world 
the standard reaction to a crisis is the imposition of a 
whole range of economic sanctions and energetic diplomacy to 
persuade other countries to follow suit. In four recent 
crises_, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December .1979, 
the American hostage crisis in Iran in 1979/80, the 
imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the 
Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982, 
the imposition of sanctions and the attempt to concert a 
common sanctions policy both within Europe and across the 
Atlantic has played a prominent part in Western diplomacy.
In all four cases the sceptical argument was vigorously 
deployed by interested parties on all sides; in two of them 
at least, possibly three, it seems likely that, in terms of 
the declared objectives of the sanctions, to get the Soviet 
Union out of Afghanistan, to restore human and civil rights in Poland, to secure the release of the American hostages, 
historians will conclude that the conventional scepticism was 
broadly vindicated. But this is an area in which governments 
seem reluctant to learn from experience. It seems more 
likely than not therefore that in future crises essentially 
the same pattern - that is, use despite scepticism - will be 



























































































A superficial solution might take the following form. In 
international relations there are neither abstract problems 
nor is there tranquillity; crises erupt and governments have 
to react to them. Moreover, two features of the contemporary 
international environment make it easier for governments to 
react by employing economic sanctions than by other means. 
The first is the paradoxical strengthening of the state 
despite states in general being increasingly Rocked together 
in a complex international division of labour. 
Interdependence may make it more difficult for the 
governments of the industrial democracies to deliver what 
they promise, since so much on which they rely lies outside 
their own jurisdiction, but they promise a great deal and 
therefore have to maintain a capability for intervention in 
the economy. In a recession when domestic pressures for 
protection are politically at their most compelling and in 
consequence the industrial states find themselves almost 
permanently involved in a whole range of trade policy 
disputes, not only are the instruments of intervention ready 
to hand but their extension to political disputes with 
socialist, or third world countries, is difficult to resist 
on doctrinal grounds alone. Theoretical objections to the
use of sanctions, which are invariably advanced by commercial 
organizations and even governments whose interests are likely 
to be adversely affected, may also seem inappropriate in the 
light of the alternatives: while it is relatively easy for
the major powers to engage in economic warfare - and in 
political terms relatively cheap also - in a nuclear world it 
remains very dangerous for them to engage in any other kind. 
Economic sanctions, in other words, may be a largely symbolic 
but still not wholly ineffective way whereby adversaries in a 
conflict can signal their position and intentions.
The second feature of the contemporary environment which is 
conducive to economic warfare is the decay of the Western institutional order which was developed under American 
leadership after 1945 as a framework for international 
relations. In one sense, of course, the rot set in almost at 
once. Within the original scheme economic sanctions had a 
definite but carefully circumscribed place as part of the 
machinery with which the five permanent members of the 
Security Council were to enforce the peace and uphold the 
norms of international society under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter. (3) The onset of the Cold War and the liberal use of 
its veto by the Soviet Union quickly undermined the use of 
sanctions "as part of a constitutionally authorised decision 
process" (4) , but so did the one major international 
experiment with sanctions outside the Cold War context, 
namely those imposed on Rhodesia between 1966-79. This was 
partly because they failed to end the rebellion and partly 
because it was clear from the beginning that Britain had 
sought their imposition as a substitute for force regardless 
of their efficacy. It was only possible to impose sanctions 
on Rhodesia, moreover, (and the same goes for the more 
limited arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the Security 
Council in 1977) , because they were supported by the Western 
powers, accepted as the best that could be achieved in the 
circumstances by the African states and did not adversely 




























































































This coincidence of..interests has not been repeated. When 
the United States proposed to the Security Council that the 
international community should impose sanctions on Iran, 
following the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and 
the taking of American hostages by a group of Islamic 
fundamentalist students, the resolution was vetoed by the 
Soviet Union. Since the United States was simultaneously 
sanctioning the Soviet Union and attempting tp persuade its 
allies to do likewise over the invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Soviet veto was predictable. Nevertheless, for those who 
clung to the idea of sanctions as an expression of the 
international rather than the national interest - the British 
for example initially insisted that they could only restrain 
their own commercial interests with the aid of an 
international mandate ' - it provided evidence of the
increasing futility of attempting to resolve crises, or even 
to reinforce the alleged norms of international society, by 
invoking Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. During the Falklands 
crisis, the British Government, having obtained a resolution 
condemning the Argentinian invasion of 2 April 1982, 
deliberately decided not to seek a further resolution 
imposing sanctions in case it should invite a Soviet veto, 
alienate the third world, and prejudice British diplomacy 
with her allies. It is possible to think of future crises in 
which UN sanctions could once again be a major issue - 
Namibia perhaps has an outside chance - but for the present 
the trend is clearly towards using sanctions as a symbol of 
"Alliance", European or even third world solidarity rather 
than as an instrument of international order.
So much for what can be taken in about the recent history of 
sanctions more or less at first glance. But if it is clear 
that some of the constraints on their use have weakened, the 
deeper political puzzle remains. For why should governments 
continue to use an instrument of foreign policy which they 
believe to be ineffective merely because there are no 
obstacles to their doing so? One answer has already been 
suggested, that it is a relatively safe way of signalling 
hostile intentions to an adversary, 
to do what exactly? In the case of 
the Argentines during the Falklands 
fairly clear: Britain demonstrated
diplomatic support and declared from
But the intentions are 
the sanctions imposed on 
crisis, the answer is that she could mobilise 
the outset that if the
Argentine would not withdraw the islands would be retaken by 
force. Here sanctions were at once an offer to the Argentine 
to withdraw, admittedly under duress, but without loss of 
life, and a traditional accompaniment to military action. 
But what could President Carter hope to achieve by embargoing 
the sale of grain to the Soviet Union after the invasion of 
Afghanistan? Clearly the embargo was not intended as a 
prelude to, let alone an accompaniment of, military action. 
Various answers have been suggested to this question but for present purposes the point to note is that although the 
embargo was lifted by President Reagan as a concession to 
mid-Western farmers who had lost out when the Argentine had 
refused to line up with other major grain exporters behind 
the United States, the experience did not prevent him from 
threatening to suspend the negotiations for a new long term 




























































































Poland, or from attempting, with only partial success to 
persuade America's European allies to respond to the Polish 
crisis by imposing sanctions of their own on both the Polish 
and Soviet governments.
Two conclusions emerge from these preliminary considerations. 
The first is that the imposition of sanctions raises 
different issues (although Tt also raises all the traditional 
ones) in the context of East-West relations than in other 
cases. The second is that these differences are often more 
important to the United States government than to its 
European allies. In the second part of this paper we focus 
on the impact of sanctions on European political cooperation 
but since this impact is partly a function of the wider 
political and indeed philosophical debate about their use in 
international relations generally, on which Americans and 
Europeans have often been divided, it is to this conceptual 
divide that we turn first.
The Theory and Practice of Sanctions in International 
Relations
(i) Sanctions and International Order
In the last analysis the problem of sanctions arises from a 
contradiction, or at least an ambiguity in liberal political 
theory. Liberal theorists have always tended to oppose war 
to commerce, the former being viewed as a fundamentally 
irrational and anachronistic activity which interrupts trade, destroys peaceful enterprise and resolves nothing, and the
latter as both rationa1 and progressive, _a way”of securing
international harmony by weaving states into a network of 
mutual interests. This was the vision of Adam Smith and even 
more_ strongly of Richard Cobden who saw free trade as a 
necessary support of a peaceful international order. It was 
also an essential part of the world view of the men who 
drafted the League of Nations Covenant and of the American 
administration which had the decisive voice in designing the 
international institutional order after 1945.
It follows from the view of war as essentially irrational 
that a rational alternative must be found. It also follows 
from the view of war as anachronistic that an alternative can 
be found within the rational, commercial world. Liberal 
theorists, of course, occupied a disenchanted world within 
which considerations of honour, responsibility and prestige 
gave way before calculations of interest and advantage. , If 
the state's dependence on international society, like that of 
the individual on national society, meant that every state 
(like every man) had its price then the denial of the 
benefits of free commerce to any state which threatened the 
peace would quickly force it to comply. For liberal 
theorists faith in this improbable logic was strengthened by 
their conviction that the State could only be justified as a 
rational scheme for the common good of the citizens. What 
held for one state, moreover, held also, according to the 
principle of the harmony of interests, for all. A belief in 
the-utility of sanctions and of their potential efficacy as 
an alternative to force is thus an understandable outgrowth, 




























































































The ambiguity arises because there are at least two ways of 
interpreting the liberal logic. The first, prevalent in those societies, primarily of course the United States, where 
competition is still viewed as essentially a collaborative 
enterprise and which in addition are lucky enough to be 
'resource-rich', generally favours resolving conflicts by 
economic means. The problem with this approach, however, is 
that in practice it tends to politicise trade,when in theory 
the liberal harmony of interests requires both national and 
international markets to be treated as autonomous. The 
imposition of sanctions immediately returns international 
relations to the Mercantilist zero-sum world from which the 
liberal internationalists were so anxious to escape. 
(Mercantilist states engaged in economic warfare all the time 
since the prevailing view was that wealth was finite and the 
winner took all. d) ) The second interpretation which is 
prevalent in liberal societies which happen also to be 
'trade-dependent' accordingly tends to oppose any 
interference by the government with market forces, 
particularly for non-economic economic reasons. On this view 
in the long run the harmony of interests will return the 
deviant to the fold automatically.
This ambiguity in liberal theory is fundamental.  ̂ In 
practice it has been reinforced in both directions by the 
growth of 'welfare' capitalism. It cannot be resolved 
theoretically, at least so long as the world does not 
correspond in reality to the liberal scheme. In certain 
circumstances, however, it can be resolved pragmatically. As 
we have already noted, with the crucial exception of 
East-West relations, this was the case between 1945 and about 
1973, the period of more or less undisputed American liberal ascendancy. During this period there emerged in effect a 
division of labour between the United Nations and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Sanctions were to be 
reserved for exceptional cases whe~n~ deviant states that 
threatened international peace and security were to be forced 
back into 1 ine by the measure set out in Article 41 of the 
Charter; but as a rule states were to pursue the goal of 
commercial disarmament, i.e. trade liberalisation, within the
GATT, bv respecting the principles of reciprocity and____
non-discrimination on which the Agreement was based.
This pragmatic resolution of the liberal dilemma could only 
work so long as the exceptions remained genuinely exceptional 
rather than creeping back into the main stream of 
international relations and secondly so long as the states 
accepted any constraints on their freedom voluntarily. This 
was because both the United Nations and the GATT were 
organisations of sovereign states. Formally, therefore, 
their members could still look to their own security and 
commercial interests. Article 51 of the Charter reserved to 
them the right of individual and collective self defence 
while Article 21 of the GATT similarly gave the contracting 
parties rights to take any action (i.e. including those which 
were inconsistent with their obligations under the Agreement) 
considered necessary for the protection of essential security 
interests. The right of self and collective defence has




























































































sometimes without the support of its regional and NATO 
allies, to justify the imposition of economic sanctions 
against the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea, and 
Vietnam as well as in some relatively minor cases, such as 
the Dominican Republic or Uganda under General Amin. It has 
also been implicitly invoked by the Arab and African states 
in justification of their more symbolic economic warfare 
against Israel and South Africa since they mostly regard both 
these states as imperial outposts whose existence, regardless 
of their policies, constitutes a form of -'permanent 
aggression'. Only recently, however, as the post-war liberal 
consensus has weakened, has controversy over sanctions 
invaded the deliberately de-politicised GATT framework.
In neither the Falklands nor the Polish crisis did the 
intrusion of the sanctions debate into the GATT have any 
discernible impact on the course of events. Yet the very 
fact of the intrusion was symptomatic of a major shift in the 
context of international politics, the result on the one hand 
of the weakening of the United States hegemonic position in 
international relations and the collapse of detente, and on 
the other of the hardening, at least for diplomatic purposes, 
of the North-South divide. Indeed, some insight into the 
recent resurgence of economic warfare in international 
relations can be gained by viewing the post-war era as framed 
by the two major cases, a generation apart, when Article 21 
of the GATT was invoked.
The first of these occasions occurred at the beginning of the 
Cold War when the United States had justified its refusal to 
issue export licences for coal mining equipment ordered by 
Czechoslovakia by reference to Article 21. The Americans 
claimed that the equipment was intended for mining uranium 
and hence to be used for military purposes. The Czech 
delegation complained in the GATT abo 
Agreement but the charge was rejected.
The second occasion on which Article 21 was invoked was in 
May 1982 when the Argentine complained in the GATT Council 
against the sanctions imposed upon it by the EEC, Australia 
and Canada. The substance of the complaint was that trade 
restrictions had been imposed on Argentina for non-economic 
reasons, that GATT had not been notified by the countries 
concerned and that the imposition of sanctions represented 'a 
concerted action against a developing country by a group of 
developed countries of which only one was engaged in a direct 
conflict with Argentina' (11).
Between the Czech complaint in 1949 and that of Argentina in 
1982 the division of labour between the United Nations and 
the GATT on the sanctions issue was gradually eroded by 
dvelopments, some of whose implications were not immediately 
apparent. The first of these concerned East West relations. 
Although Czechoslovakia had signed the Agreement before the 
1948 coup it played no significant part in GATT proceedings 
until the period of detente when various formulae were worked 
out for granting most favoured nation status to East European 
countries which sought admission. In terms of its impact on 
the international economic order, detente can be viewed in 
two ways. First as during the early 1970s, it can be




























































































interpreted as a politically desirable means of normalising 
East-West relations according to commercial rather than 
strategic criteria. So, indeed, it may have been. However, 
since the granting of MFN status by the socialist countries 
is a discretionary political matter rather than a question of 
prescribing by law the terms under which foreigners may participate in an open domestic market, the effect was 
inevitably to weaken the GATT's position as an a-political 
mechanism for trade liberalisation and the resolution of 
disputes on the basis of the accepted norms of mutual 
surveillance and consensus building. It has often been 
claimed that such success as GATT has enjoyed in basing the 
framework of commercial diplomacy on law rather than power 
political considerations rested on the deliberate avoidance 
of contentious foreign policy questions. From this second 
point of view involving GATT in East-West trade offered a 
hostage to fortune. Take, for example, the case of Poland. 
Although the Polish government was undoubtedly correct in 
claiming that the United States' withdrawal of its most 
favoured nation status in October 1982 was politically 
motivated the US was able to reply with equal validity that 
Poland had never fulfilled the conditions under which it had 
been admitted to the GATT in the first place. in such
circumstances GATT can do little to prevent an essentially 
political dispute spilling over into the field of economic 
r elat ions.
If East-West relations is clearly the most important foreign 
policy issue threatening the postwar division of labour with 
regard to sanctions, the North-South conflict, in which the 
GATT system has often been a major target, has sometimes 
rivalled it. The Argentine attempt to use the GATT not only 
to question the legality of Britain's EEC and Commonwealth 
partners imposing sanctions in the absence of a Security 
Council mandate, and hence perhaps to weaken their resolve, 
but to mobilise third world support was not wholly 
successful. But nor was it a complete failure: an Argentine
proposal for a detailed study of the interpretation of 
Article 21 which was strongly opposed by all the Western 
powers was supported predictably by all the Latin American 
countries but also amongst others, India, Rumania, Nigeria 
and Yugoslavia. Even after the re-taking of the Falklands 
and the lifting of sanctions, Brazil repeatedly insisted on 
including the question of trade restrictions imposed for 
non-economic reasons as one of the major restraints on trade 
to be considered by the Ministerial Conference in Novemebr 
1932 and succeeded in having a reference to it included in 
the Declaration.^3)
At a time when there are already numerous trade restrictions 
on Third World exports which threaten to undermine both the 
spirit and letter of the GATT, the danger of additional non 
economic restraints may not seem very great. The significance of the Argentine debate, however, does not lie 
in the probability of effective controls to limit the freedom 
of action of the contracting parties in this regard. On the 
contrary its significance is as an indication of the 
breakdown of any broadly based consensus on the rules of the 
sanctions game in North South relations. In the present 




























































































either the United Nations or the GATT will play the roles 
that were originally envisaged for them.
(i i) Sanctions and Foreign Policy
If the theory of sanctions as an instrument of international 
order is incoherent, as an instrument of foreign policy it is 
virtually non-existent. The denial of economic resources to 
the enemy by seige and blockade has an honoured place in the 
theory of war, but sanctions without military backup are 
undermined by precisely that condition, namely economic 
interdependence, which at first sight makes them seem 
attractive as a form of non-violent coercion. Only in 
circumstances where the target state is virtually totally 
dependent on the market of the opposing state, which can 
itself easily survive any counter sanctions, are they likely 
to be effective in persuading an adversary to modify its 
policy. These circumstances are so rare as to be 
theoretically uninteresting.
It is evident, however, that the absence of a plausible 
theoretical foundation for sanctions as an instrument of 
state policy has not dissuaded governments from using them. 
Professor James Barber has argued that this is because the 
objectives for which they are imposed are much more varied 
than attention to merely their ostensible purpose might 
indicate. ' 4 Indeed, he suggests the_re-are—three_.levels of 
objective, ’primary* which are concerned with the behaviour 
of the target state; 'secondary' which refer to the position 
and reputation of the imposing state; and 'tertiary' which 
are concerned with the structure and behaviour of the 
international system. The widespread consensus about the 
inability of sanctions to achieve their objectives, referred 
to at the beginning of the paper, applies to the primary 
objectives. But governments can clearly still be attracted 
to sanctions as a means of satisfying public opinion at home, 
symbolically underwriting a commitment abroad or expressing 
adherence to a particular conception of international 
morality. Thus, for example, the imposition of sanctions 
against Cuba was partly a move in the 1960 Presidential 
elections in the United States and partly a signal to the 
Soviet Union about the costs of attempting any further 
penetration of the Western hemisphere. Similarly, the 
decision by the British Labour Government to impose sanctions 
against Rhodesia in 1965 was partly to limit the damage to 
its reputation within the African Commonwealth and partly to 
protect its flank against critics from both parliamentary 
parties. And the African states and their allies continued 
to press for sanctions against South Africa (just as they 
continued to support sanctions against Rhodesia even while 
urging more forceful action) largely as a means of expressing 
support for the principles of racial equality and majority 
rule as the basis of international legitimacy.
It is impossible to assess with any confidence the success of 
sanctions in terms of the openended and idiosyncratic motives 
of the imposing governments. But it need not be assumed that the record is entirely negative. Whether or not the Soviet 
Union was deterred by US sanctions against Cuba from seeking 




























































































deterred. Similarly, while few would argue that sanctions 
were the decisive element in ending the Rhodesian rebellion 
in 1980, there is little doubt that they played a part. 
Having initiated the sanctions the British could not repeal 
them unilaterally. Thus Mrs. Thatcher discovered in 1979, 
that she was bound by the actions of her predecessors to seek 
an internationally acceptable settlement. And this check on 
any tendency by the British government to define its 
interests without reference to international opinion was 
certainly in part a consequence of the success of the 
Afro-Asian states in their campaign for racial equality: the
Western powers may continue to veto the sanctions against 
South Africa, but they have to justify this by disputing the 
appropriateness of the means not the end of racial equality 
itself.
No doubt_governments would like to believe that they can
control events by their own actions but they know that this 
is not the case. Hence, any decision to impose sanctions 
w i n  be presented in terms of the almost certainly 
unattainable primary objectives but will also reflect more 
urgent short-term domestic and international imperatives. 
Moreover any government which acts in this way will also know 
that the objectives with which it embarked on the exercise 
will change and may be quite different from those which 
require it later on either to abandon the sanctions or to 
maintain them. A single example will illustrate this very 
general point. The reason for the United States continuing 
its almost total embargo on Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam is 
not the hope that this will bring about a change of regime in 
these countries, nor that national security, the reason for 
which they were first imposed, requires the sanctions to be 
maintained, but that to life them would send the wrong 
foreign policy signals. (̂ 5) On this view it follows that for 
the imposing government the action, making its presence felt, 
is as important if not more so than the final outcome which 
remains a question of speculation and contingency.
The action itself, however, is not a sufficient justification 
whatever the expectation of the imposing government. The 
decision to impose sanctions has the necessary entailment 
that they do what is possible to ensure that sanctions are 
effective, or at the very least that they are taken seriously 
by the target government. The decision to impose sanctions 
is, therefore, inseparable from diplomacy to persuade other 
slfateTs, particularly allies, Co tollow suit. If this 
diplomacy fails, moreover, not only will sanctions fail but 
the imposing government's international prestige may be 
damaged also. It is perhaps some indication, however, of the 
importance of domestic political considerations in decisions 
regarding sanctions that this possibility is so regularly 
overlooked. It has not, for example, restrained the United 
States in its determination to use sanctions against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and Poland despite the enormous 
difficulties it faced in persuading its European allies of 
their necessity and the damage that was inflicted on the 
Alliance as a result. ̂ 6)
The generic problem of all sanctions diplomacy is how to 




























































































Security Council mandate as in the Rhodesian case, the 
policing of the sanctions will fall on national governments 
not on the United Nations and not all will have an equal 
interest in the energetic pursuit of sanction-breakers. 
Where there is a powerful moral case for sanctions but no mandate, the situation is even worse: thus when, in response
to UN pressure, the United States and Britain unilaterally 
imposed an embargo on arms sales to South Africa in 1963 and
1964, this was to the advantage of 
established itself as South Africa's
France wjiich quickly 
major arms supplier.
The existence of an alliance within which there is a 
permanent, if generally implicit, process of diplomatic 
horse-trading across issues (̂ 7), provides a more promising 
context within which to rally support, but still serves to 
focus rather than to resolve the generic problem. Thus, as 
we shall see in Part Two of this paper, even though the 
Europeans and Japanese were anxious to demonstrate solidarity 
with the United States during the hostage crisis, they were 
extremejy reluctant to follow the Americans in imposing 
sanctions”’once the Soviet Union had vetoed the US draft 
resolution in the Security Council on 13 January 1980. In 
some cases they pointed to the absence of a legislative base 
which would enable them to interfere with the commercial 
activities of their citizens; in others, France and Italy for 
example, there were spec!tic economic and political interests
which would be damaged, while Japan (which relied heavily on 
Iran's oil supplies and was deeply involved in joint projects 
in the energy field was understandably afraid that the
West would suffer more than Iran. In the end it took five 
months of heavy American pressure and some unusally explicit 
the American commitment to the Alliance could 
for g r a n t e d , b e f o r e  they fell into line. Even then they deliberately avoided making the sanctions 
retroactive. Although the crisis was not so protracted 
similar difficulties faced Britain in securing the support of 
its European allies in the Falklands crisis, particularly 
Italy which retained strong links with the large Italian 
community in the Argentine, and Ireland, which was fearful of 
compromising its neutrality.
(iii) Sanctions and East-West Relations
Finting that" not be taken
”
Such difficulties are unavoidable. Apart from the fact that 
the burden of imposing sanctions is unlikely to fall equally 
on all states involved and may well hurt those on the 
periphery of the dispute more than those at the centre, there 
are also likely to be genuine disagreements about the wisdom 
of the strategy being pursued. The diplomatic problem 
inherent in the imposition of sanctions under any 
circumstances is compounded when the target is the Soviet 
Union and its allies and the crisis raises the question of 
the status and form of East-West relations. Since two of the 
four cases involving European Political Cooperation which we 
consider in part two fall into this category it will be 
useful to conclude this section by recalling briefly the 
political background to recent transatlantic arguments over 
Afghanistan, Poland and the gas pipeline.



























































































commissioned by the United States Congress identifies three 
schools of thought about the use of trade for non-trading 
objectives. The first, typified at present though not 
historically by France and Japan, disapproves of any attempt 
to exercise political leverage through the manipulation of 
trade. The second school of thought represented by America's 
other allies, holds that trade can be used to enmesh the East 
in a web of interdependence and mutual restraint. Finally, 
there is the United States' position which contrasts with 
both these schools. It comes in a mild and a strong version. 
In the mild version trade is viewed as an instrument which 
can be used to obtain specific policy concessions from the 
outside; in the strong version it is argued that trade should 
be denied as an act of economic warfare, i.e. with the aim of 
weakening and if possible bringing about the disintegration 
of the other side.
As summarised here each of these positions is probably a 
caricature. But they nonetheless encapsulate the essence of 
the debate within the Atlantic Alliance over the use of 
sanctions in East-West relations. Nor is this debate recent 
in origin. Almost from its inception in 1950 there were 
transatlantic differences within the NATO Coordinating 
Committee (COCOM) which monitors the strategic embargo. 
These differences were intensified with the recovery of the 
European economy and the desire of European businesses to 
exploit East European and Soviet markets, where proximity 
gave them a comparative advantage over the United States. 
The specific issue was European pressure for the relaxation 
of the embargo which had originally included a very wide 
range of non-strategic goods. During the mid-1960s, by which 
time this pressure had been largely successful, the focus had 
shifted to American attempts to extend their jurisdiction 
extra-territorially in order to prevent the export of items 
which remained prohibited in the United States and which 
could only be manufactured in Europe with American 
components. The fact that the latter question was to 
re-surface in the 1980s during the pipeline dispute suggests 
that the underlying argument was not so much about the 
particular goods included on the list as about the very 
appropriateness of economic sanctions as a Cold War weapon.
The progressive relaxation of the strategic embargo was 
achieved in part because the liberal establishment in the 
United States shared much of the scepticism about its 
futility displayed by their European counterparts. As early 
as 1961 President Kennedy asked for increased discretion "to 
use economic tools to reestablish ties of friendship between 
the United States and East Europe", a theme which was 
reiterated by President Johnson after the 1963 Battle Act 
Report had noted that economic sanctions had served only as a 
"marginal restraint on Soviet aggressive capability during 
the Stalin and post-Stalin years." But even then theAmerican attitude remained far more imaginative and 
instrumental than the European. This was no doubt partly 
because foreign trade was relatively unimportant to the 
American economy until the mid-1970s, when it became heavily 
dependent on imported energy, and partly because the American 
Congress exercises a more direct control over trade policy 



























































































any event by the time Kissinger sought to extend MFN 
treatment to the Soviet Union as part of his strategy of 
making non-strategic concessions in return for 'responsible' 
Soviet behaviour, East-West trade was already firmly 
established as an inherent part of the structure of 
'normalised' relations that had been established between 
1969-73; it was no longer perceived as a tap which could be 
turned on and off at will for political reasons. In the 
United States, by contrast, even the attempt to translate its 
traditional negative sanctions into positive inducements to 
the Soviet Union to cooperate aborted when Senator Jackson 
successfully attached an amendment to the Trade Bill making 
the granting of MFN status conditional upon the Soviet Union 
allowing free emigration of Soviet Jews.
The enthusiasm for economic sanctions which has characterised 
both the Carter and Reagan administrations in the United 
States (despite Mrs. Kirkpatrick's statements to the contrary 
when justifying the withdrawal of the grain embargo ^0 has 
been a major cause of friction within the Alliance. Within 
Europe generally, even Britain, which under Mrs. Thatcher has 
been the government closest to the Reagan administration, 
there is no enthusiasm for a wholesale return to the economic cold war. This is partly because to engage in economic 
warfare after the long struggle to abandon it seems 
anachronistic: if the Soviet Union would not modify its
behaviour in response to the strategic embargo of the 1950s, 
why should it do so now merely because it needs cattlefeed 
and lags behind the West in high technology? But it is also 
because under these two administrations the struggle between 
the executive and the Congress, and between the various 
agencies of the government, which often seem to be running 
rival foreign policies has reduced European confidence in 
American leadership to its lowest point since 1945.
The collapse of European confidence in the United States was 
perhaps the most marked in West Germany which has most to 
lose by the imposition of sanctions and most at stake in the 
maintenance of detente. But in varying degrees it affected 
all the major European capitals. Since sanctions in 
East-West relations cannot realistically be expected to 
weaken Soviet military capability and seem unlikely to modify 
Soviet behaviour their imposition must be intended to signal 
Western hostility in an area where detente has offered them 
constructive diplomatic possibilities. At the same time the 
problem of how to deal with the Soviet Union after the 
invasion of Afghanistan and how to react to the Polisy crisis 
were European as well as Alliance problems. And in this 
context the Europeans had even fewer diplomatic resources 
than the Americans who could, if they chose harrass the 
Russians over a very wide front. East-West sanctions, 
therefore, were not only forced on them given the ultimate 
necessity of retaining American support but also contained 
possibilities for an independent European foreign policy. In 
the second part of the paper we discuss the impact of 




























































































Part II: The European Perspective
There can be no doubt that the last three years have 
catapulted the issue of sanctions to the top of the agenda of 
international relations in a way that has only happened once 
before, in that brief period of the 1930's when the metal of 
the League of Nations was tested and found fatigued. Even 
though discussions of sanctions as an instrument of pressure 
has largely taken place between allies, the resulting 
arguments have tended to drown the voices of those whose fate 
has inspired the debate, whether Afghans, American hostages, 
Poles or Falklanders. Thus, as we have seen in Part I, the 
deterioration of East-West relations in the 1970s has both 
revived the consideration of sanctions as an effective 
instrument of foreign policy and created major problems of 
West-West relations, without doing very much to achieve the 
nominal goals behind the sanctions. In this second section, 
we look more closely at how this has come about and in 
particular examine how the European Community (as the world's 
major trading bloc) has responded to the new problem in each 
of the four relevant cases: what ^t has been able to do,
with what willingness, and with what consequences. In 
conclusion we seek to determine whether the EC's experience 
can be fitted easily into the wider analysis of sanctions, on 
the basis of history and theory, or whether it is very much 
su i qeiTer is .
Let us begin with the details of the extraordinary way in 
which the question of sanctions has come to dominate the 
attention of Western policy-makers since 1979 - and not only 
foreign policy makers, since the taking of economic measures 
against other states involves an enormous number of 
interested parties in public and private business as well as diplomats: lawyers, financial experts, and industrialists.
There was already a body of thought and literature about the 
problem of sanctions in the chancelleries of the major 
states, but it was largely confined to the familiar issues of 
CoCom and Southern Africa. The highlighting of sanctions as 
a major channel of pressure on a wider range of foreign 
policy matters has certainly been a recent phenomenon.
( i) The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27 1979 was 
the first major precipitant of this change - the American 
hostages in Tehran having been in captivity for barely two 
months at that point. The distrust of the USSR which had 
been gestating in the USA throughout detente burst out with 
all the fury of a breached dam - even if President Carter's 
own reaction was more that of the fervour of a convert. 
Carter almost immediately announced measures against the 
Soviet Union which were strong meat given the lack of 
previous US interest in Afghanistan, and whose central component was a political ban on grain supplies. Later the 
Americans were to take the lead in pressurising Western 
athletes to stay away from the Moscow Olympic Games in 
July-August 1980. Both these steps were clearly designed to 
hit on the most vulnerable points of the Soviet Union at the 




























































































The European response was haphazard, as much because of the 
American initiatives as the actual Soviet invasion. Moscow's 
move was certainly condemned without reservation (Greece was 
not yet a full member of the Community) and the invasion seen 
as a significant extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine. But the 
European states were far less certain about what to do to 
press the USSR into withdrawal. This was partly because of a 
clear difference of view from the United States over the 
nature of the evidence provided by the invasion for an 
assessment of long-term Soviet foreign policy’, particularly 
with respect to expansion towards the Gulf. Some European 
observers may even have felt that Afghanistan would usefully 
embroil the Soviets. Most doubted that it would constitute a 
major stepping-stone to further adventures in the region. 
Uncertainty also flowed from alarm over the damage which 
could be done to European detente - in both its political and 
commercial forms - and in some quarters over the precedents 
which might be set for a common European foreign policy, thus 
far limited to declarations and diplomacy.
The American lead was both comforting and disconcerting; 
comforting in that the Community could simply pick up on the 
cue, and agree not to subvert the grain embargo by making up 
the Soviet short-fall with its own produce. (23) 
Disconcerting because it forced-the pace too quickly, at a 
time when the procedures of European Political Co-operation 
were being found wanting. In the changeover from the Irish to the Italian Presidency at the turn of the year, 1979-80, 
no-one wanted or was able to act decisively, and the nine 
foreign ministers did not actually consult until the 15 
January in Brussels. Then they decided formally not to
undermine the food embargo, and also cancelled a package of 
aid to Afghanistan itself. (24' From then on the Europeans 
began to recover their poise, and with Lord Carrington active 
behind the scenes produced on February 19 a proposal for the 
'neutralization' of Afghanistan, ostensibly to make possible 
a Soviet withdrawal without loss of face. The question of 
sanctions was conspicuous by its absence from the final 
communique. Member-states were already seeing the
dangers of using their economic ties with the East as a form 
of political coercion, and were attempting to deflect the 
Western response onto the path of diplomacy.
Thus the pattern of European scepticism towards sanctions 
over Afghanistan was quickly set. It was not to be 
disturbed. Over the next year the proposed Olympic boycott 
became a shambles, and the American embargo was rendered more 
and more threadbare by a combination of hostility from 
domestic and farming interests and sanctions-busting by other 
grain suppliers (notably Argentina and Australia). Europe 
played no small part in this since it had been agreed to 
continue 'traditional' levels of supply to the Soviet Union, 
a looseness of definition which positively invited abuse. 
Moreover the Commission continued to sell off slabs of the 
butter mountain to the Russians, at a level which exceeded 
previous annual averages and was eventually to earn the censure of the European Parliament. (26) it was hardly 
surprising, therefore, that President Reagan should choose 
the lesser of two humiliations and cancel the embargo in 




























































































a largely formal decision. The way was now clear for the 
Europeans to take more positive action on their own preferred 
path of diplomacy, and Lord Carrington flew to Moscow on 5 July, as spokesman for the Ten, to urge some kind of 
internationalised solution for Afghanistan. That this was no 
more successful than the initiative of the previous February 
did nothing, of course, to convince the Europeans that they 
had been wrong about sanctions.
( i i) The Seizure of American Hostages in Iran
The Iranian hostage crisis gradually intensified for twelve 
months after the initial seizure of the American diplomats on 
4 November 1979 until it began to be defused by the 
negotiations which eventually secured their release on the 
day of Ronald Reagan's inauguration as President, 20 January 
1981. This crisis was an extraordinary drama of modern 
international relations, at once anomalous and circumscribed, 
and arousing the most dangerous emotions in great power 
politics. In the end it did not lead to disaster, which the 
death of the hostages and/or a full-blooded American attack 
would both have been. That it did not may owe something to 
the availability of sanctions as a middle way between the 
inaction which would not have been tolerated by American 
opinion, and the 'punishment' of Iran which would have had 
serious international consequences.
As we have already seen, it is in the nature of sanctions 
that they always raise the question of multilateral action, 
particularly among pre-existing alliance partners. For the 
West European states, therefore, there was a certain 
inevitability about their involvement in the policy of 
sanctions against Iran, given that President Carter determined on the middle way. The United States was always 
going to turn to its allies for support in its appalling 
dilemma, especially given the importance of European economic 
connections with Iran. And on paper at least, the members of 
the Community were less unhappy about the resort to sanctions 
than over Afghanistan, or (as it turned out) Poland. Only 
Iran would be seriously alienated by such action, and it 
might already be a lost cause. It was quite possible that 
the new turbulence in Iran, akin to the cultural revolution 
in China, might rule out serious economic business for some 
time. It is not quite so surprising as it might seem, 
therefore, that member-states were willing to agree to the 
formal sanctions involving legislation in most national 
parliaments, which lead one commentator to speak of "one of the most important foreign policy actions in EEC history". ''
The process by which the Nine came to this point, however, 
was cautious at best, half-hearted at worst. The actual 
chronology was that in late 1979 and early 1980 the United 
States began to work for a Security Council Resolution which 
would authorise restrictions by third party states (as well 
as the US itself) on Iran's financial and commercial dealings 
with the outside world. When that plan foundered on a Soviet 
veto, the American expectation that the allies would still go 
ahead with sanctions proved to be premature.^)One British 
diplomat termed the disputes of the next few months within 




























































































basis of sanctions. The effect was to delay action and to 
convey an accurate impression to the Americans (if not Iran 
itself) of a distinct reluctance to exert real pressure. As 
it was the Nine waited until the Teheran Government failed to 
respond to calls to take the hostages under direct control in 
April, when they warned Iran that legislative measures to 
enable sanctions would be put in train. Sanctions would be 
applied from May 17 if there had notv been 'decisive progress' towards releasing the hostages. (29) in Naples on the day 
appointed the Foreign Ministers duly decided to impose 
sanctions. (~'Ai 1 Six months had therefore elapsed between the 
first American embargoes on Iran, and the Europeans following 
suit with more than gestures.
That the sanctions were effective in bringing Iran to the 
negotiating table, is hard to believe. It seems likely that 
the war with Iraq, which broke out in September 1980, and a 
natural burning-out of enthusiasm over the issue, were 
largely responsible for that. Yet the possibility should not 
be completely dismissed. Sanctions can only be expected to 
work in conjunction with favourable circumstances to isolate 
the target state, and if the Gulf war was fortuitous it was 
not wholly unreasonable to hope that Iran might find herself 
in some serious difficulty or other which would lead her to 
reassess the costs of being cut off from the world's more 
sophisticated economies. Against it, however, is the fact 
that the Europeans themselves did not expect their sanctions 
to make much difference, and more importantly, that the 
measures could not be expected to bite for quite some time. 
They did, after all, explicitly exclude all commercial 
contracts signed before 4 November 1979 and in the British 
case, before 29 May. (Britain also exempted "new contracts 
made in confirmation of an established course of business"). As it was, Iran had anticipated sanctions by increasing the 
flow of imports and relocating some vulnerable foreign 
investments. '3 ''
By ensuring that their sanctions were too little too late, 
the member-states of the European Community were effectively 
confirming their view, by now nearly set, that economic 
pressures were almost bound to be counter-productive. Where 
perhaps their realism blinded them to other important 
considerations, was in the area of their own relations with 
Washington. Although President Carter was, as it happened, 
soon to be replaced by Ronald Reagan, it did not go unnoticed 
by any political grouping in the United States that the 
allies had been found wanting on this issue, which had 
touched the deepest emotions of honour and patriotism in 
Americans. It may not be going too far to argue that the 
steady move towards a more anti-Soviet posture in American 
foreign policy, was accelerated and hardened by a certain 
bitterness against the Europeans over the Iranian affair. 
Henceforth the United States tended both to see European 
wavering over any sanctions as pusillanimity and to feel less 
obligation to take European sensibilities into account. Even 
Mrs. Thatcher's government had let Washington down over the 
sanctions against Iran.
This is one of the inevitable consequences of using sanctions 




























































































end up largely affecting issues which are essentially 
secondary to the prime purpose, but which may be even more 
vital in the long run. In the process they may test 
co-operation between friendly states to its limit, by 
introducing the issues of loyalty, and efficiency, virtues 
which are not easy to live up to in international relations. 
In the case we have just considered, the Europeans may have 
neglected this factor in favour of an understandable fixation 
with the target state.
(iii) The Imposition of Martial Law on Poland, 13 December 
1981
The case of Poland under martial law has demonstrated even 
more clearly the capacity of the sanctions issues to sharpen 
transatlantic disagreements, through what has now become an 
almost doctrinal European antipathy to this method of 
handling adversary states. This has been despite the long 
forewarning which the West has had of some dire event in 
Poland. The birth of Solidarity and the 'Prague Spring' 
atmosphere which ensued, had alerted all observers to the 
possibility of Soviet armed intervention on the model of 
1968. Indeed fairly detailed contingency plans had been 
worked out in the NATO forum which almost certainly specified 
major economic and political sanctions. It is even
possible that, in the event of an invasion, the NATO states 
and their sympathisers could have held such a policy 
together, at least for a. time. There would have been no 
incentive to keep Poland from falling apart if it were under 
the Red Army. In the event, of course, the Soviet Union 
out-manouevred the West and merely encouraged General 
Jaruzelski to impose order if not law on Poland, while 
throwing out clear hints that military rule was only meant to 
be temporary, and that some compromises would be possible.
This development was the worst possible from the Western 
viewpoint of seeking to make an effective response to the 
suppression of Solidarity. It neatly divided the United 
States from the Europeans by playing on the latter's hopes 
for a reconstructed Poland, rather than the 'liberation' 
which President Reagan's rhetoric increasingly yearned for. 
As a result, when martial law was announced on 13 December 
1981, the prompt American announcement of measures to be 
taken against both Poland and the Soviet Union (including a 
suspension of aid to the former, and the suspension of 
Aeroflot services from the latter to the United States) was 
accompanied by a heavy silence from the foreign ministers of 
the Ten, angry about lack of US consultation. (33) Qn 4 
January 1982 a communique" after a foreign ministers' meeting 
in Brussels noted only that they had 'taken note of the 
economic measures taken by the United States Government with 
regard to the USSR' and that Community members would consult, with Washington so as to avoid compromising US policies. 'J 
Subsequently the Council decided only to continue with aid to 
Poland which was handled by non-governmental organizations, 
but made even clearer their doubts about sanctions by calling 
for studies not only on possible measures against the USSR, 
but also on those taken by the USA 'with a view to 




























































































and trade of the Members States of the Community 
dissented even from this).(35) The Community had 
point of feeling itself as not quite a target of 
sanctions, but at least a victim of the cross-fire
' (Greece 
got to the 
American
By the end of February a somewhat grudging commitment had 
been made to restrict imports of specified Soviet luxury 
goods (36)f but this did nothing to bridge the gap which had 
opened up between the two halves of the alliance. Such 
measures were risible if intended seriously to embarrass the 
Soviet Union, or even to signal to it that the Europeans were 
with the Americans in spirit. Their sole purpose can have 
been at some kind of sop to the Reagan administration, in 
which form they merely added insult to injury. The solid 
Western decision in the CSCE effectively to suspend the 
Madrid review sessions was far more impressive as both a 
signal and a pressure. Naturally both Warsaw and Moscow have 
played on Western European unhappiness about sanctions by 
taking trouble to explain current policies in a reasoned, 
even confidential tone. (37) Recent relaxations of martial 
law have tended to confirm even further, therefore, the Ten's 
preference for dialogue rather than coercion. The American 
administration, by contrast, has presented dialogue as 
deception and sanctions as having failed only to the extent 
that they were not alliance-wide. Even in the NATO context, 
the United States was only able to persuade the allies to 
"identify appropriate national possibilities for action". (38) 
Its later attempts to use the Polish issue as a way of 
halting the gas pipeline deal between the USSR and Western 
Europe finally destroyed any chance of a multilateral 
embargo, and indeed actually pushed the allies into a tacit 
partnership on the issue with the Soviet Union. The EC 
states pointed to the hypocrisy of resuscitated American 
grain sales to the USSR, and with Mrs. Thatcher in the 
vanguard stood firm in the defence of this most tangible 
manifestation of detente.
(iv) Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands, 2 April 
1982
Argentina's blitzkreig against the Falkland Islands was the 
most unexpected of the four cases we are considering here. 
If the British Government was caught napping, how much more 
surprised must her European partners have been (although 
there are some interesting questions to be asked about 
co-ordination with, say, the Italian and German intelligence 
services). Given this fact, perhaps indeed because of it, 
the Community reacted with unprecedented decision. After 
all, loyalty was not too difficult to demonstrate over an 
attack on a member state's territory, especially when it was 
8000 miles away. The Falklands was a convenient issue over 
which to demonstrate the new-found efficiency and solidarity
of EPC.__Thus, the united response went a good deal further
than mere condemnation. Within two weeks member-states had 
agreed on a ban on all Argentinian imports (for a period of 
one month) and a ban on all further arms sales deliveries. 
It was almost as if the famous 'co-ordination reflex' had at 
last worked on an important matter.
That the measures were virtually a reflex, however, meant 




























































































its implications. As the next month wore on, it became clear 
that for some member-states, the sanctions had come to seem
premature. This w_as_partly because domestic political
pressure increased, particularly in Italy and Ireland, where 
ethical and ideological considerations respectively made too 
close identification with Britain embarrassing, but also 
because the likelihood of full-scale violence had 
significantly increased. EPC has always been a diplomatic 
operation first and foremost, and the prospect of being 
identified with major military operations against a country 
which could claim membership of the Third World, unnerved 
many governments in the EC. .The result was firstly that 
sanctions were only renewed for seven days on May 16, then 
that Britain suddenly found herself defeated by a conspiracy 
of her partners in the humiliating disregard of the veto over 
farm prices, and finally that Ireland and Italy formally
opted out of the next renewal of sanctions on 2 5 May.. ' . '
The glossy image of European solidarity, so admired in 
Britain and the outside world during April, suddenly cracked 
assunder. It had taken only a short real test to expose the 
thinness of the foreign policy partnership. And this was in 
large part due to the commitment to sanctions. Without this 
ambitious venture, Britain might have been able to have 
sustained full support for her policies right through the 
period of escalating military action, since the Thatcher 
Government took care to give the impression of having made 
every effort to reach a negotiated solution.
_Why were sanctions so important to Britain? The answer lies 
partly in the need to pressurise Argentina to the negotiating 
table by non-military; meanssanctions were in this regard 
the only option. Equally important, however, was the need 
for an alternative basis of support from the United States, 
which had eagerly seized upon the role of mediator as a way 
of avoiding the claims of the 'special relationship'. 
Although the US did eventually come down on Britain's side 
there was sufficient doubt throughout April as to make Her 
Majesty's Government very reliant on her partners in the 
Community, for economic and psychological support, or at 
least for the denial of their succour to Argentina. In this 
respect the Falklands was a litmus-test of the new 
orientation of British foreign policy, gradually accepted
during the 1970's. Would_the forum of European Political
Co-operation prove more than just a platform for the 
expression of British views on the Middle East, Namibia and 
the like? Could it provide Britain with the formidable extra 
strength of multilateral economic warfare and campaigning by 
nine of the most experienced diplomatic services in the 
world? To the surprise of some EPC proved only a partial 
asset to Britain. The inevitable linking of the Falklands 
issue to that of the European budget lead to considerable 
bitterness, while the steady distancing from the British 
position which was evident in the position of most member 
states after the sinking of the Belgrano made the claims 
about European unity look shallow. By contrast, it was the 
Commonwealth which appeared as Britain's most steadfast 
friends, thus introducing another anachronistic note into the 
affair and another potential brake on EPC.




























































































been anticipated. Sanctions were intended to be far more 
than symbolic. They were supposed to bring home to Argentina 
(a) the seriousness with which their action was viewed by 
other civilized states (b) the costs which would follow from 
a failure to make reasonable concessions. In that sense 
sanctions were Britain's only option between sweet reason on 
the one hand and force de main on the other. Unfortunately, 
however f Arg^nti na d id not prove susceptible to the pressure 
of sanctions (or indeed to what was an attractive offer of 
compromise in Britain's final negotiating position). Given 
that Britain thus had to rely on invasion, we cannot dismiss 
the possibility that the swift resort to sanctions inter alia 
might have driven the Argentinians into a corner from which 
they could not emerge with honour intact. Sanctions also, up 
Jto a point, created an artificial conflict between 'Europe 
and Latin America' which did not make compromise any easier. 
This case was very different from that of Iran, where the 
United States' basic interests were engaged by the flagrant 
ill-use of innocent hostages and the glorying in American 
discomfort. The Falklands invasion had to an important 
degree been Britain's own fault, and Argentina appeared 
willing to make reasonable arrangements for the islanders. A 
strong collective warning in harness with the slow progress 
of the Task Force which was in fact arranged, might have been 
more productive. ^By asking precipitately, if understandably, 
for European sanctions the British turned out to have made 
more trouble for themselves than for their target. The plain 
truth is that as events went, sanctions were irrelevant to 
Britain's success, but may have worsened the chances for a 
negotiated solution. ^
Sanctions in the Context of the European Community's External 
Relations
A chronological treatment of any problem tends to highlight 
the peculiarities of circumstance. In the cases we have 
examined of disputes over sanctions, however, it is not too 
difficult to discern some common features, which we turn to 
now, after locating sanctions in the context of the 
instruments of policy available to the collectivity of 
member-states. To the extent that the Europeans seek to 
achieve common objectives in their external environment, what 
measures are both available to them jointly, and appear 
likely to achieve more than they might do by their separate 
efforts?
Instruments of external policy are available to the Ten at 
two levels: that of EPC, and that of the Community. [ EPC /is
the most spectacular side of Europe's activity in the world. 
It is still only thirteen years old but has made considerable 
progress since the early days of disarray over the Middle 
East War in i973. This is largely because it is voluntary 
and outside the Treaties of the Community. Member-states 
feel confident that since ultimate power over their own 
foreign policy is restricted only by circumstance, not by 
legal obligation, they can enter into extensive co-operation 
without fear of being exploited, or trapped into a commitment 
they might later regret. Moreover the advantages of regional 
association in world politics are clear. The smaller states 




























































































normally be excluded. The big four (France, 
Republic, Italy and the UK) are able together 













Whatever a state can do alone, it can in theory do in liaison 
with other states of similar capacity. The only problem 
arises over resource disparities: Luxembourg could not
withdraw its Ambassador from Teheran along with the other 
eight, because it did not have one there in the first place. 
This problem is more serious when the need is to give (as in 
aid) rather than withdraw (as in sanctions). Large states 
soon become resentful of 'free-riders'. Leaving this issue 
on one side, the nature of the issue will decide what means 
EPC deploys. In the Middle East, for example, where 
Europeans' objectives are fairly clear, common policy relies 
largely on barn-storming diplomacy (endless tours by Schmidt, 
Thorn, Carrington, van der Klaauw et. al.) and by subtle
interested parties. The only concrete 
be taken are decisions to provide troops 
(as in the Sinai or Lebanon) or the 
side or another with intelligence 
EEC has no military power - although
mediation between 
actions which can 
for peace-keeping 
provision of one 
information. The
security issues are increasingly discussed - and NATO still 
monopolises such discussions as those over a putative Rapid 
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purpose in public fora (as in UN 
complex strategies of persuasion 
of the latter is the
increased bargaining strength which the Western states in the 
CSCE have derived from EEC harmony and leadership. Another 
instance*, of tec.hni.cal collaboration bearing positive fruit in 
the Community's 1977 Code of Conduct for European firms in 
South Africa, interestingly a deliberate attempt to deflect 
pressures for the imposition of sanctions. (42)
The Community level provides a further extensive range of 
possible foreign policy instruments, but instruments often 
very difficult to use. Briefly, the very existence of the 
Common Market and the common policies on steel and 
agriculture has enormous consequences for other states, and 
thus opens them up for leverage. In the area of trade, the 
EEC is the most influential factor in(^GATTlnegotiations and 
therefore possesses the potential to influence even Japan and 
the United States through 'linkage' strategies of various
kinds. The incentive of preferential access to European_
markets Ti~~an even greater potential influence on less 
developed countries. The 'global' Mediterranean policy of 
the 1970s has created an effective sphere of influence for 
the Community in the region, including even Yugoslavia, while 
the Lome system of preferences for more than 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific states has long been resented, 
particularly by the united States, as a way of maintaXFfing a 
'soft' European presence in the old colonies. The Lom^ 
system also bestows aid, on a scale which makes the Ten the 
largest groû ~Trf~Tj©'hors in the world. One does not have to 
go so far as to equate aid with imperialism to accept that 




























































































to bolster foreign exchange resources under the 'Stabex' 
scheme, can be a cheap way of reinforcing traditional ties to 
vulnerable countries anxious not to fall under the shadow of 
either super-power.
For much of the time these instruments are used primarily for 
economic advantage, which the Community has not been slow to 
press home. But it is often difficult to distinguish trade 
from politics, and there can be little doubt, for example, 
that the EC's courtship of the Arab League has' been concerned 
to encourage general stability in the Middle East as well as 
guarantee oil supplies, or that the agreement with ASEAN in 
1980 had as much to do with the international politics of 
Indo-China as with any obvious economic advantage. ' 
Equally, over the last year or two, support for the Polish 
economy has been a \Tital part of the general attempt to 
prevent a Soviet intervention and the collapse of detente.
What the Community can give, so the Community can take away, 
and this is the point at which we return to the question of 
sanctions. Since the Ten are extensively linked to most 
areas of the world through commercial and aid agreements, so 
they have the capacity to break, slow down, re-interpret or 
simply ignore existing arrangements in a more or less 
delicate attempt to make political points.”* TTTus when a 
military coup took place in Bolivia, negotiations with the 
Andean Pact countries were suspended. '44) Equally, Angola 
and Mozambique could not join the Lome system while they 
refused to accept that West Berlin was a part of the Federal 
Republic. (45)
The four cases of this paper, however, do not as a whole 
illustrate how the Community takes sanctions against target 
states. In these crises it has primarily been the 
member-states acting in the EPC forum who have taken the 
initiative and responsibility for economic measures. The USSR, Iran, Poland and Argentina simply did not have 
sufficiently important existing ties to the Community as such 
to put the Commission in the driving seat. Moreover if such 
agreements had existed, the legal and political problems 
about breaking contracts would have been serious - as we have 
seen in the pipeline dispute. Nonetheless the Commission has 
been closely involved throughout the complex discussions over 
sanctions during the last three years. It could hardly avoid 
entanglement. In the Afghanistan affair, the Commission 
acted to ensure some interim European input while waiting for 
the foreign ministers to meet. it announced steps to ensure 
that the EEC would not undermine the US grain embargo, 
agriculture being, after all, the Commission's legal 
responsibility.(46un the Iranian crisis the Commission sought 
to act for the Community under either Article 113 or Article 
224 of the Treaty of Rome, but was eventually over-ruled by 
states fearful of the supranational implications for EPC. In 
the case of Poland, the Commission has monitored food aid but 
also continued to sell butter to the Soviet Union, both 
highly political actions in their effects, while so far as Argentina has been concerned, the Commission acted for the 
Community under Article 113 in imposing a one month import 
ban - although after initial discussions in EPC, and under 




























































































emergency decisions affecting commercial policy.(47)
It is only fair to acknowledge that in a number of ways the 
Commission and EPC now mesh together rather well, and these 
examples illustrate how a highly complex, multilateral 
process of policy-making and implementation has come to work __ 
effectively. It is useful to have a specialised executive to 
whom decisions can be delegated and responsibility shifted if 
.things go wrong. Alternatively, the states can quite easily 
reclaim power from the Commission if they so choose. In 
theory the system makes possible a subtle and flexible 
sanctions policy.
Yet the blurred lines of responsibility do leave serious 
problems. The wrangling over procedure creates intolerable 
delays, as in the Iranian case. The Commission is anxious 
not to see the whole edifice of its external relations turned 
upside down by a political decision relying on economic 
means. _S_anct^ons promise to obstruct integration at least as 
much as they promote it. Moreover, some states are equally 
concerned lest by taking substantive and united action for 
once, they actually unbottle the genie of integrationism. 
Either way, a fatal hesitancy affects the sanctions.
Attempts at sanctions have, therefore, exposed a fundamental 
weakness as the centre of the process of EC external 
policy-making. It is not clear as to what extent the states wish to commit themselves to a genuinely common foreign 
policy, and to what extent they wish their domestic 
resources, some of which are under the control of the 
Commission, to be at its service. This dilemma, which at 
present may be being resolved in favour of national 
independence, has been raised by the Genscher-Colombo 
proposals for a 'European Act', and may well have been the 
death of that scheme. (48) So far the states have wanted the. 
appearance of acting together in world affairs but when real 
costs, political or financial, have seemed likely, they have 
looked inwards, and acted individually.
The sanctions attempts have also exposed weaknesses in the 
content of European foreign policies, and have suffered themselves in consequence. On the surface, the new readiness to embark on sanctions has been a sign of an increasing 
willingness on the part of the Community and its states to 
assert themselves once again in the wider world, confident 
that some instruments of pressure are to hand which can sting 
but not raise a dispute to the level of military 
confrontation. Sanctions are a substitute for riskier forms 
of action, and can perform the useful function of mollifying 
one super-power (the United States) without wholly alienating 
the other (where the USSR is the target). This is, however, 
far too facile a view, for a number of reasons.
Firstly, sanctions are themselves a confrontational strategy. 
They are deliberate attempts to coerce an adversary by an 
advantage of power. In that respect they are not 
qualitatively different from the use of military force, and 
they suffer from some of the same disadvantages, namely that 
states resent coercion, tend to respond in the same kind, and 




























































































many states and regions on a functional basis? If the 
former, then sanctions may turn out to be a principal weapon 
in the Community’s armoury (although hardly a more effective 
one). Equally, if the Community resorts easily to the use of 
sanctions in its external relations, it will move the quicker 
down the road towards Europe as a power-bloc, a protectionist 
fortress with' influence in international relations but not 
necessarily interdependence. National decision-makers have 
got to decide what kinds of advantages they .expect from 
European Political Co-operation and how far they are willing 
'to go to achieve them. (49) At present they are willing the 
ends (mediation in the Middle East, or between the 
super-powers) but not the means, either in terms of the 
instruments (e.g. common policies on arms sales, defence, 
etc.) or of general solidarity - as the national divergences 
in every crisis illustrate. It may be neither possible nor 
desirable to achieve some supra-national foreign policy, but 
in that case the Community states should be realistic about 
what they hope to achieve together.
The same applies, a fortiori to sanctions: if governments
are not willing to make a real commitment to a united stance 
over a period of time, then they should think very carefully 
before embarking on them in the first place. The problems of 
implementing sanctions are Loth major and intrinsic. They 
can therefore be anticipated and the sanctions aborted 
altogether if a willingness to ride the storm is not present. 
More importantly, the Community would probably benefit more 
from using its economic strength in altogether more subtle 
■“"Ways" than attempting to ape great power politics without the 
basic advantages of the super-powers, The quasi-military 
form of coercion represented by sanctions cuts right across 
the basic rationale of the EC-trade, industrial co-operatioj}, investment, diplomacy and cultural co-operation. The Lome 
system, the Euro-Arab dialogue, the co-ordination in the UN, 
all of which contain a nice mixture of self-protection and 
openness to the world, are more attractive and probably in 
the long-term more effective, ways of pursuing European 
objectives.
The inappropriateness of sanctions for European external 
relations tends to confirm the scepticism of those who have 
studied the subject in the wider, international context. It 
is worth noting, however, by way of conclusion, that there 
are important peculiarities about the Community which prevent 
it being a perfect model from which to generalise.
Firstly, the Ten constitute a group of states which have come 
together largely for reasons of trade and of political 
solidarity. Consequently, they are concerned, almost above 
all else, not to endanger their achievements in either of 
these two areas, although this is not the same as saying that 
they will always seek to promote further progress in them. 
Sanctions tend to cut at the heart of EC priorities and 
therefore are regarded with particular dismay.
Secondly, the member-states of the Community are both part of 
the Western camp and in the nomansland of East-West 
relations, disturbed by both superpowers, and situated in a 




























































































East-West relations create special difficulties for the 
conception and execution of sanctions, the European 
perspective tends to compound them further. The Ten are 
distinctly ambivalent about polarising the ideological 
contest, about alienating their great ally, about disrupting 
the nexuses of detente, and about resurrecting the fear of 
appeasement. Sanctions raise all these issues.
Thirdly, the geographical dispersion of the European 
Community is such that it is hardly in the position to 
blockade any state physically, even supposing that a suitable 
target should present itself. The policies of the United 
States towards Cuba, and the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia 
(themselves hardly successful), are unlikely to be emulated 
by the Ten, by virtue of geo-political realities. 
Furthermore, despite the overall commercial power of the 
Europeans, they do not exert decisive leverage over the 
economies of third states (except perhaps in parts of 
francophone West Africa) in the way that the Americans seem 
to have been able to do in Uganda (-̂ ).
It is true that there are also two characteristics of the 
European Community which make it seem particularism»»— well-equipped for the implementation of sanctions. On the 
one hand, it represents a set of 'partial' interests, in the 
sense of being parti pris, existing to serve members of the 
club rather than the international community as a whole. It 
is therefore more a.nalagous to the individual member-state 
with a self-serving foreign policy than it is to a universal 
institution seeking to promote collective security and the 
proscription of anti-social behaviour. It has, as a result, 
considerable advantages over the United Nations, or even the 
Organisation of African Unity. On the other hand, the Ten 
are also a much tighter group than the Western Alliance as a 
whole, although it is true that the latter's single function 
approach cuts the other way. In terms of ideology, stated 
purpose, decision-making, dynamics, and instruments, there is 
no doubt that the EC is a better vehicle than NATO for the 
pursuit of initiatives in foreign policy.
Yet whether in relation to its special advantages or to its 
peculiar problems, we should be careful about developing the 
theory of sanctions around the European case. In terms of 
promoting international order, the European experience is 
simply incommensurable. Moreover, in terms of the 
instruments of foreign policy, the Community is neither fish 
nor fowl, neither state nor alliance. Although it has some 
undoubted advantages from the viewpoint of a collective 
sanctions strategy, it also has important and distinctive 
problems. Since other groups of states are likely to 
encounter equivalent hurdles without possessing the 
equivalent advantages, the outlook for successful 
international ventures in the area of sanctions is hardly 
very bright.
James Mayall and Christopher Hill,























































































































































































FOOTNOTES : The Sanctions Problem: International and
European Perspectives
1. For a balanced account of the problems and
possibilities of sanctions by a practitioner see, 
Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Centre for 
International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Mass. ,1981).
2. Most states maintain legislation under which they can 
interfere in trade for reasons of national security, 
i.e. to prevent the export of items of direct 
strategic value. Under the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 the United States in addition provides for 
government controls for foreign policy reasons, a 
wider and less precisely defined category, the use of 
which is disputed even within the US government.
3. For a general discussion of sanctions within the 
United Nations system see Margaret Doxev, Economic 
Sanctions and International Enforcement (OUP for the 
RIIA, 1971).
4 . Ibid, p.14 .
5. The Times, 19 December 1979.
6. Keesinqs ContemDorary Archives 30 Apr i 1 1982.
7 . On me reamtilist attitudes to economic warfare see
Michael Heilperin, Studies in Economic Nationalism
(Geneva, Droz, 1960) Chapter 2•
8. For an attempt to argue otherwise , see M. Heilperin,
The Economic Foundations of Collective Security 






For a discussion of the background to Article 21 of 
the GATT see, John H. Jackson, World Trade and the 









For the exchange of mutual recriminations by the 
United States and Poland see GATT L/5390, 22 October 
1982, L/5396, 28 October 1982, L/5396/add 1, 28
October 1982, L/5396/add 2, 28 October 1982 and
L/5396/add 3, 29 October 1982. In the course of
these exchanges the United States first requested 
consultations on the subject of Poland's performance 
with respect to its rate of imports commitment under 
GATT Schedule LXV (the instrument of its accession) 
and then when the invitation had been accepted 







































































































For the text of the Declaration see Keesings 
Contemporary Archives, May 1983 32169A. The relevant 
section reads as follows: 'In drawing up the work
programme and priorities for the 1980s, the 
contracting parties undertake individually and 
jointly , ... (iii) to abstain from taking 
restrictive trade measures for reasons of a 
non-economic character, not consistent with the 
General Agreement.'
James Barber, 'Economic Sanctions as a Policy 
Instrument', International Affairs, July 1979, pp 
367-384.
See US Export Administration Annual Report 1980, 
International Trade Administration, US Department of 
Commerce (GPO Washington DC) p.144.
Robert Paarlburg, Lessons of the Grain Embargo, 
Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980, pp.160-1.
On this question see William Wallace, 'Issue Linkage 
Among Atlantic Governments', International Affairs, 
April 1976, pp.163-179.
Even while the United States was attempting to rally 
support amongst its allies for the draft UN 
Resolution, Japan asked for the exclusion of a joint 
Japanese Iranian petrochemical project for which the 
Japanese Government had already committed finance to 
the proprietor, Japan Mitsui, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 10 January, 1980.
Carter stepped up the public pressure on his European 
allies in a television interview and during a speech 
at the annual convention of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in which he was unusually outspoken 
about European footdragging. "They ask for 
leadership but at the same time they demand 
independence of action ... They ask for understanding 
... yet they often decline to understand us in 
return." Dr. Brzezinski, Carter's National Security 
Advisor went even further. "We cannot accept the 
proposition that either genuine detente or our common 
security is divisible. Especially in the context of 
the challenge which may affect allied interests more 
rapidlv and drastically than our own." Sunday Times, 
13 April 1980.
Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress 
(Farnborough, Gower, 1931), pp.67-72.
Doxey, op. cit., p.25.
Text of Mrs. Kirkpatrick's speech of 30 April 1981 to 
the UN Security Council concerning Namibian 
independence. Quoted in David Hunter, American 
Foreign Policy Export Controls as a Threat to Western 




























































































23. International Herald Tribune, 11 January 1980. The
power of this decision lay ultimately with member 
governments, but the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the requirement to manage trade policy give the 
Commission considerable powers of initiative. Cereal 
exports are final.lv approved by a Cereals Management 
Committee, on which both the states and the 
Commission are represented, but the latter was quick 
to let it be known that it favoured a ban on grain 
sales. For some brief background material on the 
making of agricultural trade policv in the EEC see 
Joan Pearce: The Common Agricultural Policv -
Chatham House Papers No. 15, London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1981, pp.10-15.
24. The Guardian, 16 January 1980.
25. Bulletin of the European Communities EC 2-1980, p.78.
26. The Times, 20 February 1982 (report on the 
acrimonious debate in the European Parliament of the 
previous day, in which Mr. Dalsager, the Agricultural 
Commissioner, admitted that in 1980 100,000 tons of 
butter had been exported to the USSR, as against an
average of 70, 000 over a three year period.
27. John Wv 1e s, in the Financial Times, 19 May 1980.
28. See The Times 10 January 1980 for the American
anticioation of allied cooperation.
29. This decision v/as taken at the Luxembourg Council 
Meeting of 22 April 1930. Bulletin of the European 
Communities EC 4- 1930 pp.24-5.
30. A small delay still took place because of the 
reliance on national procedures of implementation. 
Bulletin of the European Communities, EC 5- 1980,
pp.26-8.
31. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 24 October 1980, 
pp.30535-6.
32. For some informed speculation about the nature of the
contingencv plan see Stephen Woolcock: Western
Policies on East-West Trade, Chatham House Paper No. 
15, pp.63-4. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
33. The Times, 31 December 1981, and Keesinqs
Contemoorary Archives, 30 April 1982, pp.31453-57.
34. Bulletin of the European Communities , EC 12- 1981,
p. 12.
3 5. Bulletin of the European Communities , EC 1- 1982,







































































































Bulletin of the European Communities, EC 2- 1982, 
p. 49.
As in, for example, General Jaruzelski's early 
meeting with the ambassadors of the Ten - which 
admittedly led to some confusion and irritation. The 
Guardian, 4 January 1982.
Keesings Contemporary Archives, 30 April 1982,
314 60f f.
Bulletin of the European Communities, EC 5- 1982, 
p.74. The two issues were clearly 'linked in 
reality', to adapt Henry Kissinger, and set-backs in 
one soon affected the other and increased the 
fragility of the British positions.
For a more favourable view of the impact of sanctions 
in the Argentinian case, see: Daoud; M.S., and
Dajani, M.S.: 'Sanctions: The Falklands Episode',
The World Today, April 1983. More in agreement with 
the author here is Margaret Doxey: "International
Sanctions: Trials of Strength or Tests of Weakness",Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.
12 No. 1, Spring 1983.
Recent useful aopraisals of EPC include: Philippe de
Schoutheete: La Cooperation Politique Europeenne,
Brussels, Editions Labor, 1980, and David Allen, 
Reinhardt Rummel, and Wolfgang Wessels (Eds): 
European Political Cooperation, London, Butterworth, 
1982.
See James Barber: 'The EEC Code for South Africa:
Capitalism as a Foreign Policy Instrument' , The World 
Today, March 1980.
See the text of the 'joint statement on political 
issues' released after the second ASEAN-EEC 
ministerial meeting, 7-8 March 1981 (Malaysian High 
Commission in London), and Michael Leifer: 'The
European Community and ASEAN: The Political
Relationship' in John C. Kuan (Ed) The European 
Economic Community and Asia, Asia and the World 
Institute, Taipei, 1982.
Europe, Political Day (Luxembourg and Brussels) No. 
3023 20 November 1980.
See Christopher Stevens (Ed) EEC and the Third World, 
A Survey. II - Hunger in the World, London, Hodder 
and Stoughton in association with the Overseas 
Development Institute and the Institute of Development Studies, 1982, pp.6-7.
See Hermann da Fonseca Wollheim: Ten Years of
European Political Cooperation, Brussels, 1981, p.26. 
Mr. Wollheim is an employee of the Commission who has 

































































































For an excellent discussion of the legal and 
political aspects of parallel Community and 
member-states action in a single case, see: Pieter
Jan Kuyper: 'Community sanctions against Argentina:
Lawfulness under Community and International Law', in 
D. O'Keeffe and H.G. Schermers, (Eds):
Essays in European Law and Integration, 1983, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1982.
The 'Solemn Declaration on European Union' agreed at 
Stuttgart on June 19 1983, contains no new tangible 
commitments to increased integration. See The Times, 
20 June 1983 .
The points made in this paragraph are made in greater 
depth in Christopher Hill: 'Changing Gear in
Political Co-operation', The Political Quarterly, 
Jan.-March 1982, Vol. 53, No. 1.
See Judith Miller: 'When Sanctions Worked', Foreign
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